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PLEADING CONDITIONS OF THE MIND UNDER 
RULE 9(b ): REPAIRING THE DAMAGE WROUGHT BY 
IQBAL 
A. Benjamin Spencert 
"There is certainly no longer reason to force the pleadings to take the 
place of proof, and to require other ideas than simple concise statements, 
free from the requirement of technical detail." 
-Charles E. Clark, 19371 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 in which it 
pronounced-among other things3-that the second sentence of Rule 
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-which permits allegations 
of malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of the mind to be 
alleged "generally" -requires adherence to the plausibility pleading· 
standard it had devised for Rule 8(a)(2) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.4 
That is, to plead such allegations sufficiently, one must offer sufficient 
facts to render the condition-of-the-mind allegation plausible. This 
rewriting of the standard imposed by Rule 9(b )'s second sentence-which 
came only veritable moments after the Court had avowed that changes to 
the pleading standards could only be made through the formal rule 
amendment processs-is patently unsupportable for two reasons. 
First, the Iqbal Court's interpretation of Rule 9(b) is at odds with a 
proper text-based understanding of the Federal Rules: (1) The plausibility 
pleading obligation purports to be derived from the Rule 8(a)(2) 
2 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
, To view a fuller discussion of the Iqbal decision, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the 
Slide Towards Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185 (2010) [hereinafter Spencer, 
Iqbal and the Slide Towards Restrictive Procedure]. 
• 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
s Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U. S. 506, 515 (2002) (stating that different pleading 
standards "must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial 
interpretation " (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993))); Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582 (2006) ("Imposition of 
heightened pleading requirements, however, is quite a different matter. Specific pleading 
requirements are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not, as a general rule, 
through case-by-case determinations of the federal courts."). The Supreme Court has never 
indicated that rules promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act may be interpreted more 
loosely by the Court because of the Court's unique role in promulgating such rules; to the 
contrary, the Court has steadfastly adhered to the notion that it is not free to revise such rules 
through judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 
(1997) ("The text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed [through the Rules Enabling Act process] 
limits judicial inventiveness. Courts are not free to amend a rule outside the process Congress 
ordered, a process properly tuned to the instruction that rules of procedure 'shall not 
abridge .. . any substantive right."' (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000))); Harris v. Nelson, 394 
U.S. 286, 298 (1969) ("We have no power to rewrite the Rules by judicial interpretations. We 
have no power to decide that Rule 33 applies to habeas corpus proceedings unless, on 
conventional principles of statutory construction, we can properly conclude that the literal 
language or the intended effect of the Rules indicates that this was within the purpose of the 
draftsmen or the congressional understanding."). 
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obligation to "show[]" entitlement to relief,6 an obligation that reflects the 
standard for sufficiently stating claims, not the standard for sufficiently 
stating the individual component allegations thereof-which is found in 
Rule 8(d)(l), not Rule 8(a)(2); (2) text from elsewhere in the Federal Rules 
and from the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) reveals 
that the Iqbal interpretation of Rule 9(b) is unsound; and (3) evidence 
from the now-abrogated Appendix of Forms-in effect at the time of 
Iqbal-contradicts any attempt to place a plausibility pleading gloss on 
Rule 9(b). 
Second, the Court's alignment of Rule 9(b)'s second sentence with 
the 8(a)(2) plausibility pleading standard runs counter to the original 
understanding of Rule 9(b ), which was borrowed from English practice 
extant in 1937. A review of the English rule that formed the basis of Rule 
9(b ), as well as the English jurisprudence surrounding that rule at the 
time, make clear that Rule 9(b) canno� be faithfully interpreted as 
requiring pleaders to set forth the circumstances from which allegations 
pertaining to conditions of the mind may be inferred. 
Beyond reflecting an errant interpretation of Rule 9(b), the Iqbal 
understanding has resulted in tremendous harm to litigants seeking to 
prosecute their claims. Lower courts have embraced the Iqbal revision of 
Rule 9(b) with zeal, dismissing claims for failure to articulate facts 
underlying condition-of-mind allegations left, right, and center. This is 
undesirable not only because it turns on its head a rule that was designed 
to facilitate rather than frustrate such claims, but also because it 
contributes to the overall degradation of the rules as functional partners 
in the larger civil justice enterprise of faithfully enforcing the law and 
vindicating wrongs. In light of these ills arising from Iqbal's adulteration 
of Rule 9(b ), it should be amended to make the original and more 
appropriate understanding of the condition-of-mind pleading 
requirement clear, or at least revised to conform its language to the Iqbal 
Court's reimagining of it. What follows is an exploration of these points. 
6 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 ("Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket 
assertion, of entitlement to relief."); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("But where the well-pleaded 
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint 
has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief."' (quoting FED. R. 
Crv. P. 8(a)(2))). 
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A. Iqbal and Pleading Conditions of the Mind 
Although there are multiple aspects of the Iqbal decision worthy of 
critique,? our focus here will be on its perversion of the standard 
applicable to alleging conditions of the mind found in Rule 9(b ). Rule 9(b) 
reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
(b) FRAUD OR MISTAKE; CONDITIONS OF MIND. In alleging fraud 
or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be 
alleged generally.s 
The question is what pleading standard does the second sentence of Rule 
9(b )-which I will refer to as the conditions-of-the-mind clause­
impose? 
According to Justice Kennedy-the author of the Iqbal opinion-the 
conditions-of-the-mind clause should be read to mean that allegations of 
malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind must be pleaded 
consistently with the plausibility pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2). 
Justice Kennedy made this pronouncement in the following way: 
It is true that Rule 9(b) requires particularity when pleading 
"fraud or mistake," while allowing "[m]alice, intent, knowledge, 
and other conditions of a person's mind [to] be alleged 
generally." But "generally" is a relative term. In the context of 
Rule 9, it is to be compared to the particularity requirement 
applicable to fraud or mistake. Rule 9 merely excuses a party 
from pleading discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading 
standard. It does not give him license to evade the less rigid-
1 See, e.g., Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Towards Restrictive Procedure, supra note 3, at 197-
20l(criticizing Iqbal for its endorsement of a subjective approach to scrutinizing pleading that 
will permit courts to restrict claims by members of social outgroups). I have criticized the 
Twombly decision as well. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A 
Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710 (2013) [hereinafter Spencer, Pleading and 
Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists]; A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility 
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008) [hereinafter Spencer, Plausibility Pleading]. 
s FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
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though still operative-strictures of Rule 8 . . . .  And Rule 8 does 
not empower respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause 
of action, affix the label "general allegation," and expect his 
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. 9 
In this passage, Justice Kennedy declared that in pleading conditions of 
the mind, one must apply the "still operative strictures of Rule 8." Those 
strictures require "well-pleaded factual allegations" -not mere legal 
conclusions-that "show[]" plausible entitlement to relief: 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face." [Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)]. A claim has facial 
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is " . 
liable for the misconduct alleged . . . . But where the well-pleaded 
facts do not permit the court to inf er more than the mere 
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged:_but it has 
not "show[n]"-"that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. RULE 
CIV. PROC. 8(a)(2).10 
In Iqbal, the condition of the mind being pleaded was discriminatory 
intent: that the defendants undertook the challenged course of action­
the detention of certain individuals and subjugation of them to harsh 
conditions of confinement-"solely on account of' the plaintiffs race, 
religion, or national origin.11 Justice Kennedy declared that this was a 
"bare" assertion, amounting to nothing more than a "'formulaic 
recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim."12 He 
acknowledged, however, that "[ w]ere we required to accept this allegation 
as true, respondent's complaint would survive petitioners' motion to 
dismiss."13 But, alas, they (the Iqbal majority) could not accept it as true 
because the allegations' "conclusory nature . . . disentitle[d] them to the 
presumption of truth"14 and "the Federal Rules do not require courts to 
9 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686-87. 
10 Id. at 678-79. 
11 Id. at 680. 
12 Id. at 681 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555 (2007)). 
13 Id. at 686. 
" Id. at 681. 
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credit a complaint's conclusory statements without reference to its factual 
context."ts Thus, the plaintiffs claims against Ashcroft and Mueller were 
dismissed.16 Although this was an adverse outcome for Mr. Iqbal's 
individual case, the consequences of this view of Rule 9(b) have 
reverberated throughout the lower courts, facilitating the dismissal of a 
countless number of claims involving condition-of-mind allegations, 17 
B. Lower Courts and Rule 9(b) after Iqbal 
By interpreting Rule 9(b) in a way that subsumed it within the 
pleading standard applicable to stating claims, the Iqbal Court 
empowered lower courts to apply the "still operative strictures of 
Rule 8" -the plausibility requirement-to the determination of whether 
an allegation pertaining to a condition of the mind is sufficient, thereby 
infusing fact skepticism into an analysis in which the Court purports that 
alleged facts are assumed to be true. IS What this has meant operationally 
,s Id. at 686. 
16 Id. at 687. 
11 See infra Section LB. A perhaps unexpected distinct consequence of the Iqbal Court's 
interpretation of the term "generally "  in Rule 9(b) has been that lower courts have adopted and 
applied that interpretation to the use of the term "generally " in Rule 9(c), which permits the 
satisfaction of conditions precedent to be pleaded generally. See, e.g., Dervan v. Gordian Grp. 
LL C, No. 16- CV-1694 (AJN), 2017 WL 819494, at *6 ( S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2017) ("This Court 
agrees, and holds that the occurrence or ·performance of a condition precedent-to the extent 
that it need be pied as a required element of a given claim-must be plausibly alleged in 
accordance with Rule 8(a)."); Chesapeake Square Hotel, LL C v. Logan's Roadhouse, Inc., 995 F. 
Supp. 2d 512, 517 (E.D. Va. 2014) ("The fact that these adjacent subsections within Rule 9 contain 
virtually indistinguishable language suggests that the pleading requirements should likewise be 
indistinguishable. "); Napster, LL C v. Rounder Records Corp., 761 F. Supp. 2d 200,208 ( S.D.N.Y. 
2011) ( deeming the allegation that plaintiff "has performed all of the terms and conditions 
required to be performed by it under the 2006 Agreement " an insufficient "legal conclusion, " and 
recognizing that the cited cases suggesting that such "general statement[s]" are sufficient under 
Rule 9(c) "all predate Twombly and Iqbal"). This interpretation of Rule 9(c) is as inappropriate 
as, I will endeavor to show, the Iqbal Court's interpretation of Rule 9(b). However, this Article 
will maintain a focus on the erroneousness and implications of the Iqbal Court's 
misinterpretation of Rule 9(b). For a discussion of the history and purpose of Rule 9(c), as well 
as coverage of post-Iqbal cases interpreting it, see SA CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER 
& A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1302-1303 (4th ed. 2018). 
1s See Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Towards Restrictive Procedure, supra note 3, at 192 ("[T]he 
Iqbal Court's rejection of Iqbal's core allegations as too conclusory to be entitled to the 
assumption of truth reflects a disturbing extension of the Twombly doctrine in the direction of 
increased fact skepticism."). 
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is that lower courts require what Justice Kennedy called "well-pleaded 
facts"19 in support of their allegations: Pleaders must offer specific facts 
plausibly showing an alleged condition of the mind.20 Many examples of 
,. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
20 Lower courts have also expanded the Twombly and Iqbal interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) 
into Rule 8(a)(l), requiring the pleading of facts sufficient to support the plausible inference that 
there are grounds for the court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact 
that Rule 8(a)(l) does not impose a requirement to "show" that there is jurisdiction and that 
abrogated Form 7 did not reflect any such requirement. See, e.g., Wood v. Maguire Auto., LLC, 
508 F. App'x 65, 65 (2d Cir. 2013) (complaint failed to properly allege subject matter jurisdiction 
because allegation of amount in controversy was "conclusory and not entitled to a presumption 
of truth" (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662)); Norris v. Glassdoor, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00791, 2018 WL 
3417111, at *7 n.2 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2018) ("To establish diversity jurisdiction, a complaint 
must allege facts that could support a reasonable inference that the amount in controversy 
exceeds the statutory threshold . . . .  Here, the Amended Complaint leaves the amount in 
controversy to pure speculation. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 does not provide a basis for the 
Court's jurisdiction over Mrs. Norris's breach of contract and fraud claims."); Weir v. Cenlar 
FSB, No. 16-CV-8650 (CS), 2018 WL 3443173, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2018) ("(J]urisdictional 
[dollar] amount, like any other factual allegation, ought not to receive the presumption of truth 
unless it is supported by facts rendering it plausible."); Lapaglia v. Transamerica Cas. Ins. Co., 
155 F. Supp. 3d 153, 156 (D. Conn. 2016) (plaintiff required to "allege facts sufficient to allow for 
a plausible inference t;hat the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold"). 
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this practice abound both at the circuit21 and district court levels22 and are 
too numerous to list in full.23 A few examples will illustrate the point. 
21 See, e.g., Ibe v. Jones, 836 F.3d 516, 525 (5th Cir. 2016) ("The complaint must thus set forth 
specific facts supporting an inference of fraudulent intent." (citing Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 
1097, 1 102 (5th Cir. 1994))); Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir. 2015) ("!qbal 
makes clear that, Rule 9(b)'s language notwithstanding, Rule S's plausibility standard applies to 
pleading intent."); Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 6 10, 614 (7th Cir. 2013) 
("States of mind may be pleaded generally, but a plaintiff still must point to details sufficient to 
render a claim plausible."); Mayfield v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 
377 (4th Cir. 2012) (" [M]alice must still be alleged in accordance with Rule 8-a 'plausible' claim 
for relief must be articulated."); Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 58 
(1st Cir. 2012) ("[T]o make out a plausible malice claim, a plaintiff must still lay out enough facts 
from which malice might reasonably be inferred."). Although particularity is required for 
allegations of fraud,  alleging fraudulent intent may be done generally. See, e.g., In re Cyr, 602 B.R. 
315, 328 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2019) ("As previously explained, [Bankruptcy] Rule 7009(b) [the 
counterpart to Rule 9(b) in the bankruptcy context] distinguishes between pleading the 
circumstances of the alleged fraud and the conditions of the defendant's mind at the time of the 
alleged fraud. Thus, the heightened standard requiring the specifics of the 'who, what, when, 
where, and how' of the alleged fraud applies to the circumstances surrounding the fraud, not the 
conditions of the defendant's mind at the time of the alleged fraud."). 
22 See, e.g., DeWolf v. Samaritan Hosp., No. l:17-cv-0277 (BKS/CFH), 2018 WL 3862679, at 
*4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) ("[T]he Amended Complaint does not allege nonconclusory facts 
from which the Court could infer that ORDD and O'Brien were 'aware of the great number of 
mistakes regarding patients' indebtedness made by Samaritan Hospital. . . .  Indeed, the Amended 
Complaint provides no facts . . .  from which the Court could draw a reasonable inference that 
ORDD and O'Brien knew or should have known that Plaintiff did not owe the debt."); Rovai v. 
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 14-cv-1738-BAS-WVG, 2018 WL 3 140543, at *13 (S.D. Cal. 
June 27, 2018) ("Although th[e] general averment of intent and knowledge may be sufficient for 
Rule 9(b), 'Twombly and Iqbafs pleading standards must still be applied to test complaints that 
contain claims of fraud.' This means that '[p ]lain tiffs must still plead facts establishing scienter 
with the plausibility standard required under Rule 8(a)."' (citations omitted)); Mourad v. 
Marathon Petroleum Co., 129 F. Supp. 3d 5 17, 526 (E.D. Mich. 2015) ("Plaintiffs have also failed 
to sufficiently allege facts in support of their claim that Defendant's a cts, though lawful, were 
malicious. This is because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts from which this Court can reasonably 
infer that Defendant acted with the requisite state of mind. Although Plaintiffs correctly point 
out that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) permits '[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other 
conditions of a person's mind [to] be alleged generally[,]' this Rule does not, as Plaintiffs insist, 
permit a party to simply parrot the state of mind required by a particular cause of action. Rather, 
to withstand dismissal, factual allegations corroborating Defendant's malicious intent are 
necessary.'' (citation omitted)); United States ex rel. Modglin v. DJO Glob. Inc., 1 1 4  F. Supp. 3d 
993, 1024 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing allegations "that defendants 'knew that they were falsely 
and/or fraudulently claiming reimbursements' and 'knew [their devices] were being unlawfully 
sold for unapproved off-label cervical use"' because "[n]one of the facts relators 
plead[ed] . . .  support[ed] their conclusory allegation that defendants knowingly submitted false 
claims," and therefore, notwithstanding "that Rule 9(b) does not require particularized 
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The Second Circuit fully embraced the Iqbal interpretation of Rule 
9{b) in Biro v. Conde Nast, a defamation case involving a public figure.24 
After noting the requirement of showing "actual malice" to prevail on a 
defamation claim in the public figure context, the court rebuffed the 
plaintiffs claim that Rule 9{b) absolved him of the duty "to allege facts 
sufficient to render his allegations of actual malice plausible" with the 
following retort: "Iqbal makes clear that, Rule 9{b )' s language 
notwithstanding, Rule S's plausibility standard applies to pleading 
intent. . . .  It follows that malice must be alleged plausibly in accordance 
with Rule 8."2s The Seventh Circuit similarly cited Iqbal in imposing a 
requirement that allegations of bad faith be backed up with allegations of 
substantiating facts: 
Bare assertions of the state of mind required for the claim-here 
"bad faith" -must be supported with subsidiary facts. See Iqbal, ·• 
556 U.S. at 680-83, 129 S. Ct. 1937. The plaintiffs offer nothing 
to support their claim of bad faith apart from conclusory •. 
labels-that the unnamed union officials acted "invidiously" , ... 
when they failed to process the grievances, or simply that the 
union's actions were "intentional, willful, wanton, and 
malicious." They supply no factual detail to support these 
conclusory allegations, such as (for example) offering facts that 
suggest a motive for the union's alleged failure to deal with the 
grievances.26 
allegations of knowledge,". the complaint "f[e)ll short of plausibly pleading scienter under Rule 
8, Twombly, and Iqbal"), affd, 678 F. App'x 594 (9th Cir. 2017). 
23 A more comprehensive citation to the relevant cases illustrating this trend may be found 
in WRIGHT, MILLER & SPENCER, supra note 17, § 1301. An example of a case in which this trend 
was bucked is United States ex rel. Dildine v. Pandya, in which the court accepted the 
government's bald allegations of state of mind as sufficient to plead scienter. 389 F. Supp. 3d 
1214, 1222 (N:D. Ga. 2019) ("Since Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides '[m]alice, intent 
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally' and since the 
Complaint alleges Defendants submitted false claims with actual knowledge, reckless 
indifference, or deliberate ignorance to the falsity associated with such claims, the Government 
satisfies the scienter element."). 
,. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541. 
2s Id. at 544-45; see also Krys v. Pigott, 749 F.3d 1 17, 129 (2d Cir. 2014) (indicating that based 
on Iqbal, one must plead nonconclusory facts that give rise to an inference of knowledge). 
2• Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911, 9 16 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 680-83 (2009)). 
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The Eleventh Circuit too, confronting this issue in 2016, concluded that 
the Iqbal approach to Rule 9(b) with respect to allegations of malice had 
to carry the day: 
Indeed, after Iqbal and Twombly, every circuit that has 
considered the matter has applied the Iqbal/Twombly standard 
and held that a defamation suit may be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim where the plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to 
give rise to a reasonable inference· of actual malice. Joining that 
chorus, we hold that the plausibility pleading standard applies 
to the actual malice standard in defamation proceedings.27 
District courts are imposing Iqbal's condition�of-mind particularity 
requirement with respect to allegations of malice as wel1.2s For example, 
in Moses-El v. City and County of Denver29 the court wrote: 
[W]here Mr. Moses-El must plead a defendant's malicious 
intent, coming forward with a set of facts that permit the 
inference that the defendant instead acted merely negligently 
will not suffice; rather, Mr. Moses-El must plead facts that, taken 
in the light most favorable to him, dispel the possibility that the 
defendant acted with mere negligence. As noted in Iqbal, Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 9(b )' s allowance that facts concerning a defendant's mens 
rea may be "alleged generally" does not alter this analysis.30 
As a result of embracing this stringent view of the second sentence of Rule 
9(b) iri light of Iqbal's interpretation of it, the court in Moses-El dismissed 
27 Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 702 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). 
zs See, e.g., Diehl v. URS Energy & Constr., Inc., No. ll-�-0600-MJR, 2012 WL 681461, at 
*4 (S.D. ill. Feb. 29, 2012) ("Although paragraph 18 of Count V establishes that Plaintiff Diehl is 
proceeding against Defendant Walls under the theory that Walls was acting in his own self­
interest when he terminated Diehl's employment, like paragraph 17, paragraph 18 is merely a 
conclusory statement. Count V (and the Complaint as a whole), does not set forth any factual 
content from which the Court can reasonably draw the inference that Diehl was acting 
maliciously and in his own self-interest."); Ducre v. Veolia Transp., No. CV 10-02358 MMM 
(AJWx), 2010 WL 11549862, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2010) ("Ducre alleges that her 
supervisors at Veolia knew she had a disability that required her to wear a leg brace, and that they 
unjustly discriminated against her because of this disability by reassigning her to 'light duty' work 
and eventually terminating her. She asserts that she lost income and suffered hardship as a result 
of these actions. These factual allegations adequately allege malice and oppression under Rule 
8(a) and Iqbal."). 
20 376 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Colo. 2019). 
30 Id. at 1 172. 
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the plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim-in the face of an express 
allegation of malice-on the ground that the substantiating facts did not 
rule out the possibility of negligence as an alternate explanation of the 
defendant's actions: 
The sole allegation in the Amended Complaint that purports to 
demonstrate that malice is Paragraph 1 18, which reads "[g]iven 
[Dr. Brown's] qualifications and experience, as well as her 
previous testimony where she recognized the significant 
inferences that could be deduced by results such as those 
described above, her gross mischaracterization of the serological 
evidence in this case as inconclusive . . .  was malicious." But the 
conclusion-maliciousness-does not necessarily flow from the 
facts: that Dr. Brown was experienced and qualified and that she 
recognized that inferences about the perpetrator could be drawn 
from the blood test results. Although malice is one inference that � 
might be drawn from these facts, other equally (if not more 
likely) permissible inferences are that Dr. Brown was mistaken 
in her testing or analysis or that she conservatively chose not to 
ignore the (admittedly) small possibility that the test did not 
exclude Mr. Moses-EL Once again, Iqbal requires Mr. Moses-El 
to plead facts that establish a probability, not a possibility, that 
Dr. Brown acted with malice against him, and describing a set 
of facts that could readily be consistent with mere negligence 
does not suffice. Accordingly, the malicious prosecution claim 
against Dr. Brown is dismissed.31 
This is a truly remarkable decision: although Rule 9(b) states that 
"Malice . . .  may be alleged generally," and the plaintiff in this instance 
alleged that the actions were "malicious" -and the court acknowledged 
that "malice is one inference that might be drawn from these facts" -the 
claim was still dismissed for insufficiency under the Iqbal Court's 
perverse interpretation of Rule 9(b ).32 
Moving beyond allegations of malice for defamation claims, the 
Sixth Circuit has shown that it is on board with the Iqbal interpretation 
of Rule 9(b) as well. In the context of a claim under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), a Sixth Circuit panel wrote as follows: 
31 Id. at 1173-74. 
32 Id. at 1174. 
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[A]fter the Supreme Court's decisions in Iqbal and Twombly, a 
plaintiff must do more than make the conclusory assertion that 
a defendant acted willfully. The Supreme Court specifically 
addressed state-of-mind pleading in Iqbal, and explained that 
Rule 9(b) . . . does not give a plaintiff license to "plead the bare 
elements of his cause of action . . .  and expect his complaint to 
survive a motion to dismiss." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 
679 (2009). As we have explained in a non-FMLA context, 
although conditions of a person's mind may be alleged 
gen,erally, "the plaintiff still must plead facts about the 
defendant's mental state, which, accepted as true, make the 
state-of-mind allegation 'plausible on its face."' Republic Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 247 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).33 
Imposing a requirement to "plead facts" that "make the state-of-mind 
allegation 'plausible on its face,"' the court concluded that the "complaint 
contains no facts that allow a court to infer that [the defendant] knew or 
acted with reckless disregard of the fact that it was interfering with [the 
plaintiff's] rights."34 
The Third Circuit offers yet another instance of this trend, here in 
the context of an allegation of knowledge. In Kennedy v. Envoy Airlines, 
Inc. ,  a New Jersey district court reflected IqbaI's heightened intent 
pleading requirement when it wrote, "Plaintiff has not alleged any 
particularized facts which, if true, would demonstrate that Ms. Fritz or 
any other Envoy employee actually knew that the positive test results were 
false."3s The court went on to indicate that it could not accept the 
plaintiffs allegation of the defendant's knowledge of falsity because "such 
generalized and conclusory statements are insufficient to establish 
knowledge of falsity."36 On appeal to the Third Circuit, the court 
questioned the district court's conclusion, but not because it disagreed 
with the standard the district court applied.37 Instead, the Third Circuit 
33 Katoula v. Detroit Entm't, LL C, 557 F. App'x 496, 498 (6th Cir. 2014). 
34 Id. (quoting Republic Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 247 (6th Cir. 
2012)). 
3s Kennedy v. Envoy Airlines, Inc., No. 15-8058 (JB S/KMW), 2018 WL 895871, at *5 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 14, 2018). 
36 Id. 
37 Kennedy v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 760 F. App'x 136 (3d Cir. 2019). 
2020] PLEADING CONDITIONS OF THE MIND 1027 
embraced the standard but concluded that the plaintiff arguably satisfied 
it by offering additional facts showing the basis for the allegation of the 
defendant's knowledge: 
However, we conclude that this is a closer question than the 
District Court's opinion postulates. Here, while Kennedy does 
generally assert Appellee "should have known" of the falsity, he 
also offers several reasons why Appellee should have known. In 
addition to his assertion that Appellee has "administered 
thousands of tests and is aware of the uniform and constant rate 
at which alcohol is metabolized," he also references Judge 
Ferrara's findings on the matter in an exhibit to his 
complaint . . . . These facts, perhaps, lend themselves to a 
reasonable inference that Appellee knew, or should have known, 
the results from the breathalyzer were inaccurate-at least for 
purposes of surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.JS 
Thus, we have here the endorsement of a requirement to offer 
. - ,._ 
"particularized facts" that "would demonstrate"39 the defendant's 
knowledge or "lend themselves to a reasonable inference"40 that the 
defendant had the requisite knowledge. 
Again, district courts are requiring the allegation of substantiating 
facts in support of allegations of knowledge as well, c iting Iqbal's 
interpretation of Rule 9(b).41 For instance, in United States ex rel. Morgan 
v. Champion Fitness, Inc.,42 although the court recognized the tension 
between the language of Rule 9(b) and the Iqbal Court's interpretation of 
it, the district court felt it was bound to adhere to that interpretation, 
finding that the plaintiff in the case before it could survive a motion to 
dismiss only because "the Complaint's representative examples have 
sufficient detail to support a reasonable inference providing the necessary 
factual support for the assertion of Defendants' knowledge."43 
38 Id. at 140-41 .  
39 Kennedy, 2018 WL 89587 1, at *5. 
40 Kennedy, 760 F. App'x at 141. 
" See, e.g., DeWolf v. Samaritan Hosp., No. l:17-cv-0277 (BKS/CFH), 201 8  WL 3862679, at 
*4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) ("[T]he Amended Complaint does not allege nonconclusory facts 
from which the Court could infer that ORDD and O'Brien were 'aware of the great number of 
mistakes regarding patients indebtedness made by Samaritan Hospital."') . 
., No. l :13-cv-1593, 2018 WL 5114124 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2018). 
43 Id. at *7. 
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Certainly, as a matter of common sense, one would be hard pressed 
to suggest that the pleading requirements that have been outlined above 
are faithful reflections of what it means to permit conditions of the mind 
to be "alleged generally." As we have seen, courts are imposing a 
requirement for "well-pleaded facts," "specific facts," or "particularized 
facts" that "demonstrate," "show," or "establish" an alleged condition of 
the mind, which is the epitome of what plausibility pleading requires.44 
But does Justice Kennedy's analysis of Rule 9(b)-which has wrought all 
of this-stand up to scrutiny? 
A. Textual Evidence 
Justice Kennedy's determination that the conditions-of-the-mind 
clause must be read to incorporate the pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) 
was a facile-if not thoughtless-conclusion based on apparent logic: If 
"with particularity" in the first sentence of Rule 9(b) means a heightened 
pleading standard, "generally" in the second sentence of Rule 9(b) must 
mean the ordinary pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which now-post 
Twombly-requires plausibility pleading. This "reasoning" represents an 
abject failure of statutory interpretation for multiple reasons,4s three of 
which are text-based and the fourth of which is historical.46 
« See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."); Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007) ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level . . . . "). 
,s See, e.g. , McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 6 11, 6 22  (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., 
dissenting in part) ("Iqbal is in serious tension with these other decisions [Leatherman v. Tarrant 
Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 
U.S. 89 (2007); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)], rules, and forms, and the 
Court's opinion fails to grapple with or resolve that tension."). 
46 See infra Section II.B for a discussion of historical evidence demonstrating the erroneous 
nature of Justice Kennedy's interpretation of Rule 9(b). 
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First. The object of the admonitions of Rule 9(b )-and its close 
cousin, Rule 9(c)47-are distinct from that of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2)­
the provision the Court was interpreting and applying in Twombly and 
Iqbal-supplies a standard for sufficiently stating a claim for relief, which 
requires making a "showing" of entitlement to relief,4s and which, 
according to the Court, requires the satisfaction of the plausibility 
pleading standard.49 Rule 9(b), on the other hand, supplies a standard for 
sufficiently stating allegations,so which are the building blocks of claims. 
In other words, when the allegations of a complaint are joined with one 
another and viewed as a whole, one asks whether they amount to a claim, 
i.e., do they show entitlement to relief under the applicable law.s1 The 
plausibility pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) applies to an assessment of 
the latter question-whether the allegations add up to a claim-not to the 
assessment of whether an allegation has been properly stated. This 
distinction tracks the intended distinction between a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)-which challenges claims 
based on the plausibility standard of Twombly-and a motion for a mo.re 
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(c) ("In pleading conditions precedent, it suffices to allege generally that 
all conditions precedent have occurred or been performed. But when denying that a condition 
precedent has occurred or been performed, a party must do so with particularity."). 
•• FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) ("CLAIM FOR RELIEF. A pleading that states a claim for relief must 
contain . . .  a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief . . . .  "); see also Claim, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) ("3. A demand for money, 
property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right; esp., the part of a complaint in a civil 
action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for.-Also termed claim for relief"). 
<9 Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 1 1  (2014) ("(Twombly and Iqbal] concern the factual 
allegations a complaint must contain to survive a motion to dismiss. A plaintiff, [Twombly and 
Iqbal] instruct, must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility."). 
so Prior to the restyling of the Rules in 2007, references to "allegation" and "allege" in the 
rules were to variations of the term "averment" instead. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b) (2006) ("In 
all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated 
with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be 
averred generally." (emphasis added)), with FED. R. Clv. P. 9(b) (2007) ("In alleging fraud or 
mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. 
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." 
(emphasis added)); see also Allegation, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (" I. A 
declaration that something is true; esp., a statement, not yet proved, that someone has done 
something wrong or illegal. 2. Something declared or asserted as a matter of fact, esp. in a legal 
pleading; a party's formal statement of a factual matter as being true or provable, without its 
having yet been proved; A VERMENT."). 
s, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
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definite statement under Rule 12(e)52-which challenges allegations as 
being "so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a 
response."s3 Thus, in Iqbal, Justice Kennedy carelessly conflated the 
standard for articulating allegations-the province of Rule 9(b )-with the 
standard for judging the sufficiency of entire claims. 
In fact, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do set forth the general 
standard for stating an allegation in a pleading, but not in Rule 8(a)(2). 
Rather, one finds the standard applicable to stating allegations in Rule 
8(d)(l), which reads as follows: "(l) In General. Each allegation must be 
simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required."s4 This 
provision was meant to solidify the notion that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure-which took effect in 1938-were intended to be a departure 
from the highly technical pleading requirements of the past.55 Indeed, the 
52 Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans' Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 1 1 1  th Cong. 1 1  (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Professor Stephen B. 
Burbank) ("The architecture of Iqbal's mischief . . .  is clear. The foundation is the Court's 
mistaken conflation of the question of the legal sufficiency of a complaint, which is tested under 
Rule 1 2(b)(6), with the question of its sufficiency to provide adequate notice to the defendant, 
which is tested under Rule 1 2(e)."). 
53 FED. R. Crv. P. 1 2(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 1 2(e). I have previously argued that a complaint 
containing insufficient factual details to render a claim plausible under Twombly should be the 
target of a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), not dismissal under Rule 12(c). 
See Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, at 491 ("[When faced with] a complaint with 
insufficient detail . . .  [t]he appropriate remedy for such defects is the grant of a motion for a 
more definite statement, not dismissal of the claim. The defendant . . .  is entitled to look to the 
pleadings for notice, but must rely on seeking more information rather than a dismissal when 
such notice is lacking."). 
54 FED. R. Civ. P. S(d)(l). Prior to the restyling of the Rules in 2007, this provision was found 
in Rule S(e)(l) and read, "Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required." FED. R. CIV. P. S(e)(l) (2006) (amended 
2007). 
55 Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458 (1942) (indicating that subsection 
(e) (now subsection (d)) of Rule 8 was designed "to show that ancient restrictions followed under 
certain more technical rules have no place"); Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: The Last Phase-Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of 
the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976 (1937) ("Since the time when towards the end of the 
eighteenth century the long struggle for procedural reform commenced in England, the 
movement away from special pleadings and from emphasis on technical precision of allegation 
has been steady."); see also 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 128 1  (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2019) ("By including a provision such as Rule 8(d)(l) 
the draftsmen of the original federal rules undoubtedly sought to simplify pleading and free 
federal procedure from the type of unrewarding battles and motion practice over the technical 
form of pleading statements that had plagued English and American courts under common law 
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Supreme Court-prior to Iqbal-cited this provision as evidence of the 
simplified notice pleading regime ushered in by the Federal Rules.56 Why 
Justice Kennedy did not cite Rule 8(d)(l) when attempting to understand 
what Rule 9(b)'s second sentence required is unclear. What is clear, 
however, is that Rule 8(d)(l) does not require pleaders to state supporting 
facts to make a proper factual allegation.57 Neither does the conditions­
of-the-mind clause of Rule 9(b) impose such a requirement. 
Second. Evidence from elsewhere in the Federal Rules and from the 
PSLRA reveals that the Iqbal interpretation of Rule 9(b) is not sound from 
a textualist perspective. Requiring facts that make state-of-mind 
allegations plausible amounts to a requirement for particularity, which 
the first sentence of Rule 9(b) only requires for allegations of fraud and 
mistake.ss Further, it is only in an adjacent provision-Rule 9(a)(2)-that 
one finds an express obligation to state supporting facts; a party who 
wants to raise the issues of capacity or authority to sue or be sued, or the 
legal existence of an entity, must do so "by a specific denial, which must 
state any supporting facts that are peculiarly within the party�s 
knowledge."s 9  If Rule 9(a)(2) imposes a special obligation to state 
supporting facts in the narrow context to which it is confined, it cannot 
and code practice."). This provision has also been applied to curtail overly lengthy or convoluted 
allegations. See, e.g., Gordon v. Green, 602 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1979) (verbose pleadings of over 
four thousand pages violated the rule). 
56 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) ("Other provisions of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are inextricably linked to Rule 8(a)'s simplified notice pleading standard. 
Rule 8(e)(l) states that '[n)o technical forms of pleading or motions are required."'). 
57 Abrogated Form 15 provided an illustration of pleading in conformity with Rule 8(d)( l): 
"On date, at place, the defendant converted to the defendant's own use property owned by the 
plaintiff. The property converted consists of describe." FED. R. Civ. P. Form 15 (2014) (abrogated 
2015). No facts supporting the allegation of conversion are supplied in the form, which was 
authoritative at the time Iqbal was decided. See also Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 1 1  
(20 14) ("Petitioners stated simply, concisely, and directly events that, they alleged, entitled them 
to damages from the city. Having informed the city of the factual basis for their complaint, they 
were required to do no more to stave off threshold dismissal for want of an adequate statement 
of their claim." (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)( l))). 
sa See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); see also Brief for Respondent at 33, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009) (No. 07- 1015), 2008 WL 4734962, at *33 ("If Rule 9(b) means anything, it must be that 
allegations regarding state of mind can be alleged without reference to specific facts. After all, if 
allegations of fraud must be pleaded with 'particularity,' that must mean that allegations related 
to knowledge, intent, or motive, need not be pleaded with particularity."). 
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & SPENCER, supra note 
17, § 1294 (discussing Rule.9(a)(2)). 
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be that the general standard applicable to allegations found in Rule 
8(d)(l) and alluded to in the second sentence of Rule 9(b) also requires 
the statement of supporting facts sub silentio. Expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius.60 Interpreting the general standard for stating allegations to 
require the statement of supporting facts would render Rule 9(a)(2)'s 
express imposition of a requirement redundant surplusage.61 Finally, in 
the PSLRA Congress imposed a requirement for plaintiffs to "state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with the required state of mind."62 If Rule 9(b)'s second sentence 
imposes a requirement to plead facts that support an inference of intent 
and other conditions of the mind, Congress's move to impose a 
particularity requirement with respect to state of mind in the PSLRA 
would have been largely unnecessary.63 
60 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 107 (2012) ("Negative-Implication Canon[:] The expression of one thing implies the 
exclusion of others (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).") ; see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 5 13 
("[T]he Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the question of the need for greater particularity 
in pleading certain actions, but do not include among the enumerated actions any reference to 
complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius." 
(quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168 (1993))); cf Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048, 1064 (2019) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) ("The absence of a textual foundation for the majority's rule is only accentuated when 
§ 1608(a)(3) is compared to § 1608(a)(4), the adjacent paragraph governing service through 
diplomatic channels . . . .  Unlike § 1608(a)(3), this provision specifies both the person to be served 
and the location of service. While not dispositive, the absence of a similar limitation in 
§ 1608(a)(3) undermines the categorical rule adopted by the Court."); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 
S. Ct. 830, 844 (2018) ("Zadvydas's reasoning is particularly inapt here because there is a specific 
provision authorizing release from § 1 225(b) detention whereas no similar release provision 
applies to § 1 23l(a)(6) . . . .  That express exception to detention implies that there are no other 
circumstances under which aliens detained under § 1225(b) may be released."). 
61 See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 360 (1956) ("We must read the body of regulations . . . so as 
to give effect, if possible, to all of its provisions."); see also Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 
37 1,  386 (2013) ("[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest when an interpretation would 
render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme."). 
62 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2018). 
63 Retirement Bd. of Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago v. FXCM Inc., 767 F. 
App'x 139, 141  (2d Cir. 2019) ("While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that 
'conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally,' under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act ('PSLRA'), a securities plaintiff must nevertheless allege facts that suggest a 'strong 
inference' of scienter."). 
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Third. What used to be Official Form 21-now conveniently 
abrogated,64 but in force at the time Iqbal was decided-provided the 
definitive and authoritative65 illustration of what both sentences of Rule 
9(b) permit and require. It read, in pertinent part, as follows: 
4. On date, defendant name conveyed all defendant's real and 
personal property if less than all, describe it fully to defendant 
name for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff and hindering 
or delaying the collection of the debt.66 
In this example we have both an allegation of fraud and two allegations 
of intent, each of which must look to Rule 9(b) for the applicable standard 
of sufficiency. Regarding the allegation of fraud-the "circumstances" of 
which must be stated "with particularity"-Form 21  taught that offering 
the "who, what, when, where and how" of the fraud is sufficient, an 
understanding innumerable courts have recognized.67 When we turn to 
the two allegations relating to intent-(1) that the aforementioned 
actions by the defendant were undertaken "for the purpose of defrauding 
the plaintiff' and (2) that those same actions were done "for the purpose 
of . . . delaying the collection of the debt" -Form 2 1  taught that bald, 
64 FED. R CIV. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015); see also COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 276 (2013) 
("[T]he pleading forms live in tension with recently developing approaches to general pleading 
standards."); see generally A. Benjamin Spencer, The Forms Had a Function: Rule 84 and the 
Appendix of Forms as Guardians of the Liberal Ethos in Civil Procedure, 15 NEV. L.J. 1113 (2015) 
[hereinafter Spencer, The Forms Had a Function] (discussing the significance of the abrogated 
Official Forms and the motivation behind their abandonment). 
65 Prior to its abrogation in 2015, Rule 84 provided: "The forms in the Appendix of Forms 
suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate." 
FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015). That the forms were sufficient under the rules was an 
important component of the rule that was added in a 1946 amendment for the very reason that 
courts were treating the forms as merely illustrative rather than authoritative. See Spencer, The 
Forms Had a Function, supra note 64, at 1122-24. 
66 FED. R. Crv. P. Form 21 (2014) (abrogated 2015). 
67 WRIGHT, MILLER & SPENCER, supra note 17, § 1297 (" A formulation popular among courts 
analogizes the standard to 'the who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of any 
newspaper story."'); see, e.g ., OFI Asset Mgmt. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber, 834 F.3d 481, 490 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (applying the formulation to a securities fraud class action); Zayed v. Associated Banlc, 
N.A., 779 F.3d 727, 733 (8th Cir. 2015) (applying the formulation to a claim of aiding and abetting 
fraud); United States ex rel. Heineman-Gula v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(applying the formulation to a qui tam action under False Claims Act). 
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conclusory, and factless statements suffice to allege intent properly.68 
What we undeniably do not have in Form 21 is the slightest support for 
Justice Kennedy's homespun, improvised diktat that allegations of intent 
and other conditions of the mind must be supported by facts that render 
the allegations plausible. That such lawless imperialism-which would be 
derided as judicial activism if it came from another quarter-was 
endorsed by the sometimes textualists Antonin Scalia69 and Clarence 
Thomas?o is a dismaying but unsurprising instance of the inconsistency 
that has too often characterized their purported interpretive 
commitments.71 
68 FED. R. Crv. P. Form 21 (2014) (abrogated 2015); see Sparks v. England, 113 F.2d 579, 581 
(8th Cir. 1940) ("The appendix of forms accompanying the rules illustrates how simply a claim 
may be pleaded and with how few factual averments."); Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 
7, at 474 ("The allegation [in Form 21] , however, remains fairly conclusory and factless in 
character. It contains a bald assertion that the conveyance was for fraudulent purposes without 
offering any factual allegations in support of this assertion. Nevertheless, the rulemakers felt that 
the information offered sufficed even under the heightened particularity requirement of Rule 
9(b) because it achieves notice-the defendant has a clear idea of the circumstances to which the 
plaintiff refers in alleging fraud and can prepare a defense characterizing the cited transaction as 
legitimate."). 
69 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 16, 
22 (1997) ("[W]hen the text of a statute is clear, that is the end of the matter. . . .  The text is the 
law, and it is the text that must be observed."). 
70 See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U. S. 255 (20.00) (Thomas, J.) ("[O]ur inquiry focuses 
on an analysis of the textual product of Congress' efforts, not on speculation as to the internal 
thought processes of its Members."). 
71 Justice Thomas's inconstancy is manifestly self-evident on this score, having admonished 
in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. that the pleading requirements imposed by Rule 8(a)(2) cannot 
be amended by the Court outside the rule amendment process but then signing on to two 
opinions doing just that in Twombly and Iqbal. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 
515 (2002) (stating that different pleading standards "must be obtained by the process of 
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation" (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant 
Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 168 (1993))). For an example of 
Justice Scalia's fair-weather textualism, one can consult Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, in which 
Justice Scalia abandoned a faithful application of the plain text of Rule 23(a)-which requires 
questions "common to the class" -to impose his own wished-for requirements that there be a 
common injury among class members and that the common issues must be central to the dispute. 
564 U. S. 338 (2011); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and 
Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 464 (2013) ("Justice Scalia, who often touts his 
fealty to the written text of enacted rules and statutes, displays none of that discipline in Dukes. 
The language of Rule 23(a)-that 'there are questions of law or fact common to the class' -
expresses no need for class members to have suffered the 'same injury."'); id. at 474 ("Rather than 
follow his own textualist diktats, Justice Scalia pronounces efficiency as the objective policed by 
the commonality rule, then uses that to banish those common questions that do little to further 
2020] PLEADING CONDITIONS OF THE MIND 
B. The Original Understanding of Rule 9(b) 
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Although the textual arguments against the Iqbal Court's 
interpretation of Rule 9(b) provide compelling evidence of its 
waywardness, and the review of the caselaw on this point above 
demonstrates that this erroneous interpretation of Rule 9(b) has real 
world negative implications for claimants, there is historical support for 
the view that Iqbal got the interpretation of Rule 9(b) terribly wrong. 
When Rule 9(b) was originally promulgated in 1938, the drafters of the 
rule provided helpful guidance as to its meaning in the committee notes. 
The note pertaining to Rule 9(b) read as follows: "See English Rules Under 
the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) 0. 19, r. 22."n What this 
citation refers to is Order 19, Rule 22 of the English Rules of the Supreme 
Court (the English Rules) that were promulgated under the Judicature 
Acts of 1873 and 1 875.73 That rule-which the Advisory Committee 
indicated was the source of Rule 9(b )-read as follows: 
22. Wherever it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, 
knowledge, or other condition of the mind of any person, it shall 
be sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out the 
circumstances from which the same is to be inf erred.74 
Here we see that the lineage of the second sentence of our Rule 
9(b)-the conditions-of-mind clause-is an English rule that provides 
that conditions of the mind may be alleged "as a fact without setting out 
the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred."1s Given that the 
1938 rulemakers cited to Order 19, Rule 22 as their source-or at least as 
their inspiration-for Rule 9(b ),76 it is reasonable to suspect that "averred 
generally" (now "alleged generally") must have been intended to mean 
something akin to "without setting out the circumstances from which the 
efficiency from its ambit, without regard to the fact that commonality, not efficiency, is the 
unambiguous requirement of Rule 23(a)(2)."). 
n FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee's note to 1937 adoption. 
73 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Viet. c. 66, as amended by Supreme Court 
of Judicature Act 1875, 38 & 39 Viet. c. 77. 
,. English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) 0. 19, r. 22. 
7s Id. 
76 See, e.g., Love v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 26 F. Supp. 481, 482 ( S.D. Miss. 1939) ("This 
rule [Rule 9(b)] very probably was adopted from the rules of the Supreme Court of England, 
Order XIX, Rule 22."). 
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same is to be inferred."77 What did this language mean and how was it 
interpreted at the time the 1 938 rules of procedure were first crafted? 
Commentator 's Notes and Official Forms Accompanying the English 
Rules. As the notes that appear following Order 19, Rule 22, in the 1937 
edition of the Rules of the Supreme Court explain, to plead knowledge 
under the rule, "[i]t is sufficient to plead, 'as the defendant well knew,' or 
'whereof the defendant had notice,' without stating when or how he had 
notice, pr setting out the circumstances from which knowledge is to be 
inferred."7s Respecting allegations of malice, the notes remark, "But he 
[the plaintiff] need not in either pleading [the statement of the claim or 
the reply] set out the evidence by which he hopes to establish malice at 
the trial."7 9 The same was said of allegations of fraudulent intent; although 
under the English Rules allegations of fraud had to be specified by stating 
the acts alleged to be fraudulent,so the notes to Rule 22 indicated that 
"from these acts fraudulent intent may be inferred; and it is sufficient to 
aver generally that they were done fraudulently."s1 
77 English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937), 0. 19, r. 22. The 
Supreme Court has employed similar reasoning when interpreting other Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. For example, in seeking to understand the meaning of Rule 42(a), the Court wrote 
the following: 
[This case is] about a term-consolidate-with a legal lineage stretching back at least 
to the first federal consolidation statute, enacted by Congress in 1813. Over 125 years, 
this Court, along with the courts of appeals and leading treatises, interpreted that term 
to mean the joining together-but not the complete merger-of constituent cases. 
Those authorities particularly emphasized that constituent cases remained 
independent when it came to judgments and appeals. Rule 42(a), promulgated in 1938, 
was expressly based on the 1813 statute. The history against which Rule 42(a) was 
adopted resolves any ambiguity regarding the meaning of "consolidate" in subsection 
(a)(2). It makes clear that one of multiple cases consolidated under the Rule retains its 
independent character, at least to the extent it is appealable when finally resolved, 
regardless of any ongoing proceedings in the other cases. 
Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1 125 (2018) (internal citation omitted). 
78 English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937), 0. 19, r. 22 (note). 
79 Id. 
so Id. 0. 19, r. 6 ("In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, 
fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence . . .  particulars (with dates and items if 
necessary) shall be stated in the pleading . . . .  "). 
81 Id. 0. 19, r. 22 (note). 
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Reference to the forms in Appendix C of the English Ruless2 
confirms the view set forth in the notes discussed above. For example, one 
finds there the following model allegation of the defendant's knowledge: 
3. The wilful default on which the plaintiff relies is as follows:­
C.D. owed to the testator 10001. , in respect of which no interest 
had been paid or acknowledgment given for five years before the 
testator's death. The defendants were aware of this fact, but never 
applied to C.D. for payment until more than a year after 
testator's death, whereby the said sum was lost.83 
No facts from which it might be inferred that the defendants had such 
knowledge are offered anywhere within this model form. In another 
instance of pleading knowledge-this time within a complaint for a 
"fraudulent prospectus" -Appendix C offered the following example: 
4. The prospectus contained misrepresentations, of which the • 
following are particulars :-
( a) The prospectus stated " . . . .  " whereas in fact . . .  . 
(b) The prospectus stated " . . . .  " whereas in fact . . .  . 
( c) The prospectus stated " . . . .  " whereas in fact . . .  . 
5. The defendant knew of the real facts as to the above particulars. 
6. The following facts, which were within the knowledge of the 
defendants, are material, and were not stated in the 
prospectus . . .  _s4 
The next form in Appendix C, which is for a "fraudulent sale of a 
lease," similarly contained an unadorned and unsupported allegation of 
the defendant's knowledge. It read as follows: "The plaintiff has suffered 
damage from the defendant inducing the plaintiff to buy the goodwill and 
lease of the George public-house, Stepney, by fraudulently representing 
s, Id. 0. 19, r. 5 ("The forms in Appendices C., D., and E., when applicable, and where they 
are not applicable forms of the like character, as near as may be, shall be used for all 
pleadings . . . .  "). 
,, The Judicature Acts, Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Appx. C., § II, No. 2 (emphasis 
added) . 
.., Id. § VI, No. 13 (emphasis added). 
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to the plaintiff that the takings of the said public-house were £40 a week, 
whereas in fact they were much less, to the defendant 's knowledge."85 
Allegations of malice-like allegations of knowledge-were 
protected from particularized pleading by Order 19, Rule 22;86 thus, it is 
helpful to find an example of such pleadings in Appendix C as well. The 
malicious prosecution form read as follows: "The defendant maliciously 
and without reasonable and probable cause preferred a charge of larceny 
against the plaintiff before a justice of the peace, causing the plaintiff to 
be sent for trial on the charge and imprisoned thereon . . . .  "87 Here, 
consistent with Order 19, Rule 22, we find no greater specificity than was 
presented in the context of the allegations of the defendant's knowledge 
outlined above. 
English caselaw. The scant but available contemporaneous decisions 
of English courts interpreting and applying the pleading rules confirm 
that they did not require the pleading of any facts substantiating the basis 
for condition-of-the mind allegations. Glossop v. Spindlers8 is particularly 
illustrative. In that case, the plaintiff alleged-in paragraph one-that the 
defendant maliciously printed and published in a newspaper certain 
defamatory matter and-in paragraph two-that "the defendant, on 
previous occasions, and in furtherance of malicious motives on his part 
towards the plaintiff, maliciously printed and published of the plaintiff 
various statements and paragraphs in the said newspaper, and these, for 
convenience of reference, are set forth in the appendix hereto."89 The 
defendant sought to have paragraph two and the appendix stricken as a 
violation of the pleading rules. 9o The court ruled that the allegation of 
paragraph two itself was sufficient, in that "it contained a statement of 
material facts upon which the plaintiff would rely at trial as constituting 
malicious motives." 91 However, the court also ruled that the appendix 
must be stricken because "it contained the evidence to prove the alleged 
8s Id. § VI, No. 14 (emphasis added). 
86 English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) 0. 19, r. 22. 
87 The Judicature Acts, Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Appx. C., § VI, No. 15 (emphasis 
added). 
88 (1885) 29 SJ 556 at 556 (Eng.). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 557. 
91 Id. 
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facts in paragraph 2, and was, therefore, a violation of ord. 19, r. 4."92 Two 
things are worth noting here. First, Rule 4, which was cited by the Court, 
supplied the ordinary pleading standard, which required "only, a 
statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party 
pleading relies for his claim . . .  but not the evidence by which they are to 
be proved . . . . "93 Providing additional details beyond the allegation of 
malicious intent violated that rule. Second, when the plaintiff went above 
and beyond what was required, offering (in an appendix) additional facts 
from which malicious intent could be inferred, that was not lauded as 
helpful to the presentation of the case but was challenged by the 
defendant as a pleading offense and thrown out by the court as 
inappropriate. Thus, not only were facts from which malice might be 
inferred not required of pleaders under Order 19, Rule 22, the pleading 
of such factual detail appears to have been affirmatively prohibited by 
Order 19, Rule 4.94 
Herring v. Bischoffsheim9s offers similar insight into the minimal 
pleading burden under the English Rules in the context of an allegation 
of fraudulent intent. There, the plaintiffs claim was that the prospectus 
issued by the defendant was fraudulent to the knowledge of the defendant 
company; the plaintiff offered extensive evidentiary details in support of 
that allegation. The court, in response to a motion to strike these details 
92 Id. 
93 English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O." 19, r. 4. A "material 
fact" might be described as what in the United States previously was referred to an "ultimate fact" 
under code pleading, as opposed to evidentiary facts. See, e.g., In re Dependable Upholstery Ltd 
(1936) 3 All ER 741 at 745-46 (Eng.) (holding an allegation that dividends were paid from an 
improper source to be a "material fact" under Rule 4 and that plaintiffs would not be ordered to 
give particulars of that fact, which would merely disclose the evidence  by which that fact was 
intended to be proved). But see Millington v. Loring (1880) 6 CPD 190 at 190, 194 (Eng.) ("[I]n 
my opinion those words ['material facts'] are not so confined, and must be taken to include any 
facts which the party pleading is entitled to prove at the trial."). Thus, in Glossop v. Spindler the 
"material fact" is that the publication was with malicious intent, while the evidentiary facts are 
those details on which the ultimate fact of malicious intent is based. Glossop v. Spindler (1885) 
29 SJ 556 at 557 (Eng.). An innovation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to avoid 
distinguishing between ultimate and evidentiary facts by abandoning any reference to pleading 
facts altogether. See CHARLES CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LA w OF CODE PLEADING § 38, at 242 
(2d ed. 1947). 
9< See also Gourard v. Fitzgerald (1889) 37 W.R. 265 (Eng.) (rejecting a lower court's order 
for particulars pertaining to the plaintiffs' allegation that statements were maliciously published 
by the defendants). 
9s ( 1876] WN 77 (Eng.). 
1040 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 :1015 
from the statement of the claim, agreed with the defendant that the 
pleading violated Order 19, Rule 4, and permitted the plaintiff to amend.96 
In doing so, the court wrote, 
It is unnecessary for the statement of claim to state the motives 
which led to the issuing of the prospectus, or the scheme of 
which it is a part. It is sufficient to state generally that the 
prospectus was, to the knowledge of the defendants, fraudulent, 
without specifying the particulars.97 
Finally, we have some evidence of how allegations of knowledge 
generally were permitted under these rules. In Sargeaunt v. Cardiff 
Junction Dry Dock & Engineering Co.,9s the court rejected a request for 
particulars setting out how certain knowledge on the part of the 
defendant came to exist, citing and relying on Order 19, Rule 22 in the 
process. In Griffiths v. The London & St. Katharine Docks Co. ,99 the court 
reported that the plaintiff alleged that the defendant company "knew or 
ought to have known of the defective, unsafe, and insecure condition of 
the said iron door" without further elaborating the facts supporting the 
allegation.100 No fault was found with this allegation; the claim only failed 
because the plaintiff failed to allege also that he was unaware of the said 
defective condition, a critical element of stating the negligence claim 
asserted in the case.101 
From the previous discussion, it is readily apparent that the 
progenitor of Rule 9(b)'s conditions-of-the-mind clause-Order 19, Rule 
22 of the English Rules (and the English cases that applied that rule)­
give lie to the notion that Rule 9(b) may properly be interpreted to require 
the pleading of facts that make state-of-mind allegations plausible. That 
the 1938 rulemakers cited to the English rule in the notes accompanying 
Rule 9(b) can reasonably be read as evidence of their intent to embrace 
the associated English practice of not requiring pleaders to allege facts 
from which conditions of the mind might be inferred. But Rule 9(b)'s 
% Id. 
97 Id. 
9s [1926] WN 263, 264 (Eng.) ("[T]he plaintiff had no right under the rule [Order 19, Rule 
22] to obtain the particulars asked for, and they must be refused."). 
99 (1884) 1 2  QBD 493 (Eng.). 
100 Id. at 494. 
101 Id. at 496. 
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admonition must also be understood in the wider context of the liberal 
general pleading ethos of the English Rules embraced by the drafters of 
the 1938 rules. 102 As Charles Clark, reporter to the original rules 
committee, noted at the Cleveland Institute on Federal Rules: 
I think there is no question that the rules can not [sic] be 
construed to require the detailed pleading that was the theory, 
say, in England in 1830 . . . .  About the only time when this 
specialised detailed pleading was really tried was in England in 
the 183O's, after the adoption of the Hilary Rules. The Hilary 
Rules were the first step in the procedural reform in England, 
and they got the expert Stephen to write the rules. He went on 
the theory, which many experts have, that what you want is 
more and better and harsher rules, and never at any time in the 
history of English law was pleading so particularised, and never 
were the decisions so strict and technical, and never was justice 
more flouted than in that short period in the '3O's, . . .  which led 
immediately to greater reform, finally culminating in the 
English Judicature Act and the union of law and equity. J03 
In other words, the pleading reforms brought about by the English 
Judicature Acts, which were a response to the highly particularized 
pleading regime of the Hilary Rules, were the inspiration for much of 
what Charles Clark and the 1938 drafters were trying to do with their new 
pleading rules. But the result of the Iqbal revision of Rule 9(b )-and the 
antecedent rewriting of the ordinary pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) in 
Twombly-is that we have regressed very nearly to the state of affairs that 
the 1938 rule reformers sought to save us from. That this was done 
without due regard for the previously-reviewed evidence of Rule 9(b)'s 
proper meaning is problematic. Equally (if not more) disconcerting, 
102 A.B.A., FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT 
WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 40 (Edward H. Hammond ed., 
1938) ("I would say this, that I think you will see at once these pleadings follow a general 
philosophy which is that detail, fine detail, in statement is not required and is in general not very 
helpful."). 
10, A.B.A., RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO 220-22 (William W. 
Dawson ed., 1938); see also JOHN BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 97-98 
(5th ed. 2019) (discussing the Hilary Rules and their development). 
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however, is that the Iqbal interpretation of Rule 9(b) is at variance with 
the policies that underlie the rule, a topic to which we now turn. 
III. THE AFFRONT TO THE POLICY BEHIND RULE 9(b) 
By applying the plausibility fact-substantiation standard to 
allegations of conditions of the mind, this heightened pleading standard 
is being applied to the very kinds of allegations _Rule 9(b)'s second 
sentence was quite obviously crafted to protect. 104 Requiring pleaders to 
provide the particulars of a person's state of mind is not something that 
all pleaders will be able to do without the benefit of discovery, 105 making 
the imposition of such a requirement at the pleading stage unfaif.106 This 
is particularly true for plaintiffs asserting discrimination claims, who are 
more likely ( than fraud plaintiffs or public figure defamation plaintiffs, 
for example) to lack the resources to overcome the information 
asymmetry that exists at the pleading stage.107 Wrongful conduct is 
already something not likely to be broadcast; wrongful intentions-which 
lurk within a person's mind-are even more likely to be obscured from 
external view. The drafters of Rule 9(b) understood this, agreeing with 
the English system that requiring complainants to articulate facts 
10< WRIGHT, MILLER & SPENCER, supra note 17, § 1301 ("[T]he trend seems to be an embrace 
of the more rigid pleading requirements for conditions of mind that the second sentence of Rule 
9(b) was designed to suppress."). 
10s Id. ("The concept behind this portion of Rule 9(b) is an understanding that any attempt to 
require specificity in pleading a condition of the human mind would be unworkable and 
undesirable. It would be unworkable because of the difficulty inherent in ascertaining and 
describing another person's state of mind with any degree of exactitude prior to discovery."). 
106 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post- Conley Era, 52 How. 
L.J. 99, 160 (2008) ("[T]o the extent Twombly permits courts to dismiss claims for failing to be 
supported by factual allegations that the plaintiff is not in a position to know, that seems unfair. 
This appears to be the case for many civil rights claims, where claimants often lack direct evidence 
of an official municipal policy or of discriminatory motivation and where circumstantial evidence 
of bias is equivocal. It is in these types of cases that plaintiffs need access to discovery to explore 
whether they can find needed factual support. Thus, courts should not invoke Twombly to require 
the pleading of substantiating facts that a plaintiff needs discovery to gain .. .. "). 
107 See, e.g., Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("We are at a loss 
as to how any plaintiff, including a civil rights plaintiff, is supposed to allege with specificity prior 
to discovery acts to which he or she personally was not exposed, but which provide evidence 
necessary to sustain the plaintiffs claim, i.e., that there was an official policy or a de facto custom 
which violated the Constitution."). 
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substantiating an alleged condition of the mind would be unreasonable. 10s 
In a system in which the right to petition courts for redress is 
constitutionally protected by the Petition Clause of the First 
Amendment, 109 the pleading standard must be one that avoids blocking 
potentially legitimate claims solely based on the inability of claimants to 
articulate supporting facts-such as those pertaining to conditions of the 
mind-that it would be nearly impossible for them to know.uo As we have 
seen, Rule 9(b )' s second sentence was designed with this concern in mind, 
as was Rule l l(b)'s allowance of making "factual  contentions [that] will 
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further 
investigation or discovery." 1u The Iqbal fact-substantiation 
interpretation of Rule 9(b) thus has pushed the system over the line that 
the Petition Clause was designed to protect, something that a reparative 
revision to Rule 9(b) could address.112 
An additional consideration suggesting that imposing a heightened 
burden for condition-of-the-mind pleading is problematic from a policy 
perspective derived from the Iqbal Court's endorsement of the use pf 
"judicial experience and common sense" to inform judges' plausibility 
assessments.m Research has shown that people make decisions based on 
various biases and categorical or stereotypical reasoning, particularly 
when they lack complete information about an individual or a situation. 
,os See supra Part II. 
100 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging . . .  the right of the 
people . . .  to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."); see also Cal. Motor Transp. 
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (stating that the First Amendment serves as 
the constitutional basis for the right of access to courts). 
110 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. l, 29-30 
(2009) [hereinafter Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine] ("[R)equiring particularized 
pleading in these types of cases [e.g. discrimination cases] effectively prevents some claimants 
from seeking redress for what could be legitimate grievances. If the constitutional line is drawn 
at permitting procedural rules to bar 'baseless' claims that Jack a 'reasonable basis' -a line that 
admittedly has not been definitively drawn by the Court-then the line drawn by contemporary 
pleading doctrine is inapt in certain cases." (quoting Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 
731, 743 (1983))). 
I l l  FED. R. CIV. P. ll(b)(3). 
1 1 2  See Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, supra note llO, at 30 ("Reforming the 
doctrine to relieve plaintiffs of the obligation to allege the specifics underlying subjective 
motivations or concealed conditions or activities might be one way to remedy the imbalance."). 
1 1,  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) ("Determining whether a complaint states a 
plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."). 
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Jerry Kang and his collaborators explained this phenomenon in the 
context of the 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss after Iqbal: 
[W]hen judges turn to their judicial experience and common 
sense, what will this store of knowledge tell them about whether 
some particular comment or act happened and whether such 
behavior evidences legally cognizable discrimination? Decades 
of social psychological research demonstrate that our 
impressions are driven by the interplay between categorical 
(general to the category) and individuating (specific to the 
member of the category) information. For example, in order to 
come to an impression about a Latina plaintiff, we reconcile 
general schemas for Latina workers with individualized data 
about the specific plaintiff. When we lack sufficient 
individuating information-which is largely the state of affairs 
at the motion to dismiss stage-we have no choice but to rely 
more heavily on our schemas. 
Social judgeability theory connects back to Iqbal in that the 
Supreme Court has altered the rules structuring the judgeability 
of plaintiffs and their complaints. Under Conley, judges were 
told not to judge without the facts and thus were supposed to 
allow the lawsuit to get to discovery unless no set of facts could 
state a legal claim. By contrast, under Iqbal, judges have been 
explicitly green-lighted to judge the plausibility of the plaintiffs 
claim based only on the minimal facts that can be alleged before 
discovery-and this instruction came in the context of a racial 
discrimination case. In other words, our highest court has 
entitled district court judges to make this judgment based on a 
quantum of information that may provide enough facts to 
render the claim socially judgeable but not enough facts to 
ground that judgment in much more than the judge's 
schemas.1 14 
The "judicial experience and common sense" that the Court 
empowered judges to rely upon in assessing claims necessarily 
complicates the now-imposed duty to offer facts substantiating 
1 1 •  Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 U CLA L. REV. 1124, 1160, 1162 (2012). 
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conditions of the mind because pleaders will have to overcome the 
categorical schemas dominant within the judicial class. ' 15  Thus, we see 
Justice Kennedy himself providing exhibit number one: In Iqbal, he 
found insufficient facts to substantiate the allegation that Ashcroft was 
the "principal architect" of the discriminatory policy, "and that Mueller 
was 'instrumental' in adopting and executing it," but credited the 
allegation that "the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, 
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . .  as part of its 
investigation of the events of September 1 1" and that " [t]he policy of 
holding post-September- 1 1th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of 
confinement until they were 'cleared' by the FBI was approved by 
Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER . . . .  " 116 Because both sets of 
allegations were articulated with the same level of specificity, it cannot 
be-as Justice Kennedy suggested-that the difference between them is 
that the former are conclusory and the latter are factual. 117  Rather, Justice 
Kennedy is applying a schema that tells him that it is plausible for the FBI 
Director to have directed the arrests and detention of thousands of Arab 
Muslim men, and for the FBI Director and the Attorney General to have 
"cleared" the policy of holding those men in restrictive conditions, while 
it is not plausible to believe-without substantiating facts-that the same 
1 1 5  Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Towards Restrictive Procedure, supra note 3, at 197-98 
("Beyond constituting a violation of the assumption-of-truth rule and interfering with the jury 
right, the Iqbal majority's new fact skepticism is problematic because it derives from, and gives 
voice to, what appears to be the institutional biases of the Justices, as elite insiders with various 
presumptions about the conduct and motives of other fellow societal elites."); Hearing, supra 
note 52, at 13 ("Judgments about the plausibility of a complaint are necessarily comparative. They 
depend in that regard on a judge's background knowledge and assumptions, which seem every 
bit as vulnerable to the biasing effect of that individual's cultural predispositions as are judgments 
about adjudicative facts."). 
116 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 
1 1 ,  Id. at 699 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's holding that the statements it selects 
are conclusory cannot be squared with its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint 
as nonconclusory."); see also Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Towards Restrictive Procedure, supra 
note 3, at 193 ("These are not conclusory assertions but rather plain-English descriptions of the 
phenomena they attempt to describe. There can be no question that if I were to say 'Mr. Smith 
was the "principal architect" of the Chrysler building,' that would be a non-conclusory factual 
claim, as would the statement that 'Ms. Smith "approved" the design plans for the Chrysler 
building.' These statements are factual because they make claims about what transpired and who 
took certain actions.''). 
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men designed and had a hand in the execution of a discriminatory arrest 
and detention policy. 1 1 s  
Because it  is  well documented that the use of categorical thinking 
and explicit and implicit biases infect all of us11 9_including judges120-
and because among those biases are background assumptions about the 
behaviors and tendencies of members of various groups-whether those 
groups are public officials, racial, 12 1 ethnic,122 or religious groups, 123 
11s See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682 (indicating that because "Arab Muslims" were responsible for 
the September 11 attacks, an "obvious alternative explanation" for the arrests in question was 
Mueller's "nondiscriminatory intent" to detain aliens "who had potential connections to those 
who committed terrorist acts"). 
119 See, e.g., JERRY KANG, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR 
COURTS (2009), https:/ /www.ncsc.org/ ~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender°/420and%20Racial% 
20Fairness/kangIBprimer.ashx [https:/ /perma.cc/WYQ3-4X27]. 
120 See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A 
National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 1 13 (2017) ("Little has been 
said of the role of the way judges perceive these fundamental issues and the actors involved: how 
individual lives are automatically valued, how corporations are implicitly perceived, and how 
fundamental legal principles are unconsciously intertwined with group assumptions. This Article 
suggests, and the empirical study supports the idea, that automatic biases and cognitions indeed 
influence a much broader range of judicial decisions than has ever been considered."); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 195, 
1 210-11  (2009) (finding among judges a strong implicit bias favoring Caucasians over African 
Americans); Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: 
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Vair Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed 
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REV. 149, 1 50 (2010) ("I have discovered that we unconsciously act 
on implicit biases even though we abhor them when they come to our attention . . . .  Jurors, 
lawyers, and judges do not leave behind their implicit biases when they walk through the 
courthouse doors."). 
121 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004) (showing biases connecting African-American faces 
with perceptions of the presence of a weapon). 
122 See, e.g., Levinson, Bennett & Hioki, supra note 120, at 89-92 (discussing implicit bias 
against Asians). 
123 See, e.g. ,  id. at 1 10-1 1  ("The results of the study, for example, showed that federal district 
judges (the very judges who make sentencing determinations for the federal crime we presented) 
were more likely (of marginal statistical significance) to sentence a Jewish defendant to a longer 
sentence than an otherwise identical Christian defendant."). 
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cultural minorities,124 or women12s-allegations of discriminatory intent 
(for example) will run up against judicial presumptions of non­
discrimination, which research has proven are unwarranted.126 
Nevertheless, because of the presumption of non-discrimination, a 
pleader will be under a particularly stringent burden to offer facts that 
dislodge judges from this presumption if it is hoped that they will accept 
an allegation of discrimination as plausible. As I have previously argued, 
[o]nce we make normalcy in the eyes of the judge the standard 
against which allegations of wrongdoing are evaluated, we 
perversely disadvantage challenges to the very deviance our laws 
prohibit. A civil claim is all about deviation from the norm, 
which has happened many times in history-even at the hands 
of good capitalist enterprises and high-ranking government 
officials. While businesses and government officials may 
normally not do the wrong thing, sometimes (or perhaps often) ., 
they do. When that happens, they certainly are not going to leave �. 
clear breadcrumbs for outsiders to expose them. All we may see 
are the fruits of their wrongdoing, which in turn will be all that 
can be alleged in a complaint. Without the opportunity to 
initiate an action that asserts deviance in the context of 
seemingly normal behavior, such wrongdoing will go 
undiscovered and unpunished. 127 
Freeing pleaders from the obligation to offer sufficient facts to convince 
normatively biased judges that an allegation of deviant intent is plausible 
is necessary if we wish to give such claimants the opportunity to access a 
judicial process in which they can employ the tools of discovery to further 
substantiate and vindicate legitimate claims. 
12, Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
1455 (2010); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going 
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009). 
12s See, e.g., Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit 
to Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474, 475 (2005) (fmding study participants shifted 
their valuation of the worth of various credentials to preference a male in selecting a police chief). 
,u See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 
AM. ECON. REV. 991, 992_ (2004) (showing that identical applicants with White-sounding versus 
Black-sounding names received fifty percent more callbacks for interviews). 
m Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, supra note 
7, at 1734. 
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More broadly, an interpretation of Rule 9(b) that obligates pleaders 
to substantiate condition-of-mind allegations with supporting facts is 
inconsistent with any sound theory of what worthwhile procedural rules 
should be designed to accomphsh. If we want rules that promote the 
classic law enforcement objectives of general and specific deterrence, as 
well as the reification of abstract legal rules and the pacification of the 
governed that comes from its perception of systemic legitimacy and 
efficacy, then those rules must be-or at least must be seen to be­
facilitative of efforts to vindicate transgressions of the law. No rule-or 
interpretation thereof-that by design shields many wrongdoers from 
culpability on the basis of the inability of their accusers to perform the 
metaphysical task of mind reading will succeed at permitting the 
translation of our laws as written into meaningful prohibitions that 
would-be transgressors will be inclined to respect. 
IV. RESTORING RULE 9(b) 
We have seen that the Iqbal majority's interpretation of Rule 9(b)­
and the lower courts' subsequent application of it-are inconsistent with 
the proper and original understanding of Rule 9(b). Further, we have seen 
that the more faithful understanding of the rule laid out in this Article has 
the benefit of reflecting a wiser approach to the kind of pleading 
obligations that are sensible to impose with respect to state-of-mind 
allegations. Rule 9(b) should thus be restored to its intended meaning, 
which can happen in one of two ways. The first would be for the Supreme 
Court to correct its error in Iqbal in a future case concerning the 
application of Rule 9(b ). Lower courts, equipped with the insight it is 
hoped this Article will provide, could (and should) make an effort to 
interpret and apply Rule 9(b) in ways that honor the language, history, 
and intent behind it. However, because both of these responses seem 
unlikely, a second approach-a restorative amendment to Rule 9(b )­
should be pursued. 
To revise Rule 9(b) to eliminate IqbaI's requirement that sufficiently 
alleging conditions of the mind requires the statement of well-pleaded 
facts that render the allegation plausible, the rule should be amended as 
follows: 
(b) FRAUD OR MISTAKE; CONDITIONS OF MIND. In alleging fraud 
or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
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circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be 
alleged generally without setting forth the facts or circumstances 
from which the condition may be inferred. 
This revised language borrows directly from Order 19, Rule 22-the 
original source of the admonition that was promulgated as the second 
sentence of Rule 9(b) in 1938. It also has the benefit of directly and 
unambiguously addressing what has become problematic about lower 
court application of Rule 9(b )-the imposition of a requirement to state 
facts that provide the basis for condition-of-the-mind allegations. 
An accompanying committee note for this revision would need to 
be crafted to ensure that there is no room for courts-including the 
Supreme Court-to interpret Rule 9(b) in a way that reverts towards the 
contemporary interpretation of the rule that has taken hold since Iqbal. 
The following may be a possible approach: 
Subdivision (b ). Rule 9(b) is being revised to abate a trend among 
the circuit courts of requiring litigants to state facts 
substantiating allegations of conditions of the mind in the wake 
of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See, e.g., Ibe v. Jones, 
836 F.3d 5 16, 525 (5th Cir. 2016); Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 
541, 544-45 (2d Cir. 2015); Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 
734 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2013); Mayfield v. Nat'l Ass'n for 
Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. , 674 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 58 
(1st Cir. 2012); see also Moses-El v. City & Cty. of Denver, 376 F. 
Supp. 3d 1 160 (D. Colo. 2019). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court 
indicated that the term "generally" in Rule 9(b)'s second 
sentence referred to the ordinarily applicable pleading standard, 
which it had interpreted to require the pleading of facts showing 
plausible entitlement to relief. Unfortunately, lower courts took 
this to mean that they were to require pleaders to state facts 
showing that allegations of conditions of the mind were 
plausible. Regardless of whether such an understanding was 
intended by the Supreme Court, such an interpretation is at 
odds with the original intended meaning of Rule 9(b ); with Rule 
8(d)(l )'s controlling guidance for the sufficiency of allegations 
as opposed to claims; with the text of Rule 9(b)-which omits 
any requirement to "state any supporting facts" as is found in 
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Rule 9(a) (2); and with a reasonable expectation of  what pleaders 
are capable of stating with respect to the conditions of a person's 
mind at the pleading stage. 
To sufficiently allege a condition of the mind under revised Rule 
9(b), a pleader may-in line with Rule 8(d) ( l )-simply, 
concisely, and directly state that the defendant, in doing 
whatever particular acts are identified in the pleading, acted 
"maliciously" or "with fraudulent intent" or "with the purpose 
of discriminating against the plaintiff on the basis of sex," or that 
the defendant "had knowledge ofX." For example, to sufficiently 
allege intent in a fraudulent conveyance action, a pleader would 
be permitted to state, "On March l ,  [year], defendant [name of 
defendant 1]  conveyed all of defendant's real and personal 
property to defendant [name of defendant 2] for the purpose of 
defrauding the plaintiff and hindering or delaying the collection 
of the debt." 
Responding parties retain the ability-under Rule 12(e)-to 
seek additional details if the allegations are so vague or 
ambiguous that they cannot reasonably prepare a response. See 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506 (2002). However, a 
pleader's failure to offer facts from which a condition of the 
mind may be inferred cannot form the basis for a dismissal for 
failure to state a claim under the revised rule. 
Were Rule 9(b) to be revised in this manner, one might argue that it 
would entirely undo the Iqbal and Twombly regime, permitting 
conclusory legal allegations to receive credit that permits claims to 
proceed without having to demonstrate plausibility. Not so. Take 
Twombly itself, for instance. There the key allegation was that the 
defendants entered into an unlawful agreement to exclude certain players 
from the market; the Court's beef was that there were not sufficient facts 
to which one could point that would assure courts that that allegation was 
more than mere speculation. 12s The proposed revision of Rule 9(b) would 
not alter this result because the allegation of an unlawful agreement is not 
12• Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007) ("We think that nothing contained in 
the complaint invests either the action or inaction alleged with a plausible suggestion of 
conspiracy."). 
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a condition of the mind that would be covered by Rule 9(b). Rather, it is 
an allegation pertaining to something that the defendants have done.129 
Thus, the Court would have still been able to hold (under its plausibility 
pleading approach) that the complaint fell short under Rule 8(a)(2). 
Amended Rule 9(b) would comport with the result that the Court 
produced in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 130 a result the Court endorsed 
in Twombly. In Swierkiewicz, the plaintiff alleged that he had been 
discriminated against in employment based on his nationality but-in the 
district court's words-"ha[d] not adequately alleged circumstances that 
support an inference of discrimination."rn The Court disagreed and 
found the complaint to be sufficient.m As the Twombly Court explained 
it, "Swierkiewicz's pleadings 'detailed the events leading to his 
termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and 
nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his 
termination"' and indicated that "[w]e reversed on the ground that the 
Court of Appeals had impermissibly applied what amounted to · a 
heightened pleading requirement by insisting that Swierkiewicz allege 
'specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds 
showing entitlement to relief." 133 The proposed revision of Rule 9(b) 
simply honors the approach to pleading discrimination endorsed by the 
Court in Swierkiewicz and Twombly-specific facts substantiating an 
allegation of discrimination are not necessary; the sufficiency of a 
discrimination complaint will rest on whether the facts alleged beyond 
those pertaining to conditions of the mind plausibly show entitlement to 
relief. In the context of Swierkiewicz's discrimination claim, by alleging 
that he had been fired and replaced with a younger person of a different 
nationality, coupled with his allegations of negative age-based comments 
from his supervisor, 134 Swierkiewicz crafted a complaint that satisfied the 
Rule 8(a)(2) standard without having to provide the substantiation of 
12• Id. at 551 (reporting that the plaintiff alleged that the defendants "ha[d] entered into a 
contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry . . .  and ha[d] agreed not to 
compete with one another") .  
13-0 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
131  Id. at 509. 
m Id. at 515. 
133 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508, 5 14). 
rn Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508-09. 
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discriminatory intent that the defendants and lower courts had 
demanded. 
That said, amending Rule 9(b) as proposed would alter the outcome 
in Iqbal. A key requirement for being able to state a claim against the 
government officials in Iqbal was that their conduct was done with 
discriminatory intent. Justice Kennedy declared that a bald allegation of 
discriminatory intent was not entitled to the assumption of truth because 
it was conclusory and not supported by well-pleaded facts.135 He reached 
this conclusion by interpreting Rule 9(b)'s second sentence as imposing 
a plausibility requirement as described above.136 However, Justice 
Kennedy acknowledged that a rule obligating the Court to accept an 
allegation of discriminatory intent as true would require a different result: 
"Were we required to accept this allegation as true, respondent's 
complaint would survive petitioners' motion to dismiss." 137 Allegations 
of discriminatory intent, like all allegations pertaining to a defendant's 
state of mind, are factual contentions because they pertain to experienced 
reality rather than to the legal consequences that flow therefrom. Thus, 
once conditions of the mind are permitted to be simply stated under 
revised Rule 9(b ), those allegations of fact will be entitled to benefit from 
the accepted assumption-of-truth rule that the Court continues to 
endorse.BS 
Similarly, revised Rule 9(b) would undo the position.that the circuit 
courts have taken in this field, abrogating the decisions in which they have 
dismissed claims based on a determination that substantiating facts must 
13s Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) ("These bare assertions, much like the pleading 
of conspiracy in Twombly, amount to nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation of the elements' 
of a constitutional discrimination claim, namely, that petitioners adopted a policy "'because of," 
not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.' As such, the allegations 
are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." (citations omitted)). 
136 See supra Section I.A. 
137 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686. Were there to be an interest in providing a greater degree of 
protection against litigation for defendants who are potentially entitled to qualified immunity (as 
may have characterized the defendants in Iqbal), it would be appropriate to vindicate that interest 
through an amendment to the Federal Rules ( or via a legislative enactment) tailored to such cases, 
not through a wholesale judicial reinterpretation of the generally applicable rule found in Rule 
9(b). 
1,s Id. at 678 (referring to "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations 
contained in a complaint"); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Factual allegations must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the 
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).'' (citation omitted)). 
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be offered to support allegations pertaining to conditions of the mind. 
This, of course, is by design and is the principal purpose behind the 
revision. Thus, in a case like Biro, 139 in which the Sixth Circuit required 
the plaintiff to offer facts substantiating the allegation of actual malice,140 
the result would be different. There, the plaintiff alleged as follows 
regarding actual malice: 
Biro generally alleged that each of the New Yorker defendants 
"either knew or believed or had reason to believe that many of 
the statements of fact in the Article were false or inaccurate, and 
nonetheless published them," and that they "acted with actual 
malice, or in reckless disregard of the truth, or both."141 
Malice and knowledge are conditions of the mind protected from 
particularized pleading by Rule 9(b ). As revised, Rule 9(b) would treat the 
quoted allegations as sufficient. As in Iqbal, crediting these allegations as 
true would result in rendering the complaint sufficient under Rule 
8(a)(2). Indeed, there are certainly a great many cases in which crediting 
allegations of condition of the mind as true will render them impervious 
to attack under Rule 8(a)(2). If such a result is not desired, then making 
the Iqbal interpretation of Rule 9(b) explicit or abrogating the second 
sentence of Rule 9(b) altogether would be the appropriate course to 
pursue.142 
"• 807 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2015). 
1,0 Id. at 542. 
141 Id. at 543. 
142 Codifying the Iqbal interpretation of Rule 9(b)'s second sentence could be achieved by 
revising it to read as follows: "Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind 
may be alleged generally by setting forth the circumstances from which the condition may be 
inferred." Codification might also be achieved by deleting the second sentence of Rule 9{b). 
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CONCLUSION 
Revising promulgated federal rules through judicial decision 
making is a perilous143 and illegitimatei44 business. After Twombly and 
Iqbal, one cannot know what Rule 8(a)(2)'s "short and plain statement of 
the claim showing entitlement to relief' is, nor can one know what Rule 
9(b) means when it permits a party to allege conditions of the mind 
"generally," without consulting the judicial interpretation of those rules 
by courts, notwithstanding the divergence of the latter from the text of 
the former. 145 If our rules of federal civil procedure are not to be an overtly 
duplicitous exercise in which the rules say one thing but mean another, 146 
then either the Court must interpret the rules faithfully according to their 
text, or the text of the rules should be brought into conformity with their 
interpretation. Stated differently, given that the Iqbal interpretation of 
Rule 9(b) and that which it has spawned among lower courts is manifestly 
143 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 534 ( 1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
("The implications of the majority's opinion today require every lawyer who relies upon a Federal 
Rule of Evidence, or a Federal Rule of Criminal, Civil, or Appellate Procedure, to look beyond 
the plain language of the Rule in order to determine whether this Court, or some court 
controlling within the jurisdiction, has adopted an interpretation that takes away the protection 
the plain language of the Rule provides."). 
144 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) ("A requirement of greater 
specificity . . .  'must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial 
interpretation'" (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993))). 
14s My view, as expressed extensively in previous work, is that the Court's interpretation of 
Rule 8(a)(2)-like its interpretation of Rule 9(b)-diverges from the meaning supported by all 
relevant textual and historical evidence. See Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A 
Response to Twiqbal Apologists, supra note 7; Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7 .  
Restoring the intended meaning of Rule 8(a)(2) could be achieved by revising it as follows: " a  
short and plain statement of the claim showing that articulating the pleader's grounds is entitled 
te-for relief . . . .  " Other approaches have been put forward as well. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, 
King Arthur Confronts Twlqy Pleading, 90 OR. L. REV. 955, 979-83 (2012) (providing multiple 
suggestions for revising Rule 8(a)(2) to restore it to its pre-Twombly meaning). Unfortunately, it 
appears that ship has sailed. Hopefully, however, there remains the possibility that the 
misinterpretation of Rule 9(b) can be repaired. 
M6 See Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 REV. LITIG. 79, 80-81 
(2006) (" [T]he rich context of common law procedural rules . . .  function in conjunction with the 
1938 Rules to determine the actual function of the federal district courts . . . .  These Other Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure . . .  interact with the 1938 Rules in such a way as to counter the apparent 
progressive character of the 1938 Rules and produce a functioning system which is not 
progressive in reality but conservative."). 
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counter to the intended meaning of Rule 9(b) and to all available textual 
evidence, the rulemakers have a duty to at least consider whether the rule 
should be revised in a way that better tracks how courts interpret and 
apply the rule, or be revised to correct the errant construction. Doing 
nothing, though, should not be an option-unless we147 want to be 
complicit in the duplicity that permits liberal-sounding rules to be 
restrictive in practice.148 None of us should want that, although I fear that 
doing nothing is precisely the most likely thing that we will do.149 
147 I currently serve as a member of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, which bears responsibility for considering proposals to amend the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The views expressed in this piece are my own and do not reflect the position of the 
Committee or its members. 
"" See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
353, 369 (2010) ("[P)rocedure's central thesis (the liberal ethos) and antithesis (the restrictive 
ethos) can be synthesized into a concept I refer to as ordered dominance: procedure's 
overarching, unified goal is to facilitate and validate the substantive outcomes desired by society's 
dominant interests; procedure's veneer of fairness and neutrality maintains support for the 
system while its restrictive doctrines weed out disfavored actions asserted by members of social 
out-groups and ensure desired results."). 
1•• This sentiment arises from my experience as a member of the Rules Committee. Whether 
it be due to the prioritization that necessarily arises in the context of limited deliberative capacity 
and bandwidth, the institutional conservatism that comes from being a committee dominated by 
members of the judiciary, or the awkwardness associated with rebuffing the work of the Court 
(and the Chief Justice) under whose aegis we operate, the Rules Committee in modern times has 
shied away from undertaking liberalizing, access-promoting reforms in response to interpretive 
drift in a restrictive direction. See Brooke Coleman, Janus-Faced Rulemaking, 4 1  CARDOZO L. 
REV. 921, 927 (2020) ("The second theme-institutional actor timidity-demonstrates how the 
Committee is quite timid of its role in the Rules Enabling Act process. That process requires the 
work of other institutional actors, and one of the most fraught relationships is between the 
Supreme Court and the Committee. After all, the Committee's members are appointed by the 
Chief )ustice, the work of the Committee is delegated from the Court to the Committee, and the 
Court is part of the process as its approval is required for an amendment to be adopted."). As 
Charles Clark pointed out long ago, it is not surprising that the judiciary will constantly turn back 
to restrictive pleading, but it is our job to periodically press for corrective measures that will 
maintain the access-facilitating ethos that the rules were originally intended to institutionalize. 
See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 459-60 (1941, 1942, 1943) ("With the 
development of code pleading, from the Field Code first adopted in New York in 1848 to the 
present time, the emphasis was shifted from the detailed issue-pleading of the common law to a 
statement of the facts, so simple, it was said at the time, that even a child could write a letter to 
the court telling of its case. Notwithstanding this history, however, courts recurrently turn back 
to the course of requiring details. Such a return, on the whole, is not surprising, for all rules of 
procedure or administration tend to become formalized and rigid and need to be checked 
regularly with their objectives and in the light of their present accomplishment. Moreover, the 
pressure from one side to force admissions from the opponent and the court's desire to hurry up 
adjudication and avoid lengthy trials tend somewhat to push in this same direction. It is 
necessary, however, always to bear in mind that nowadays we are not willing to enforce harsh 
rules or to sacrifice a party for his lawyer's mistake, induced perhaps by technical ignorance or 
even by lack of clarity of the decisions."). 
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